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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2005, Kori Cioca was raped. 1 This rape was the culmination of a se-
ries of assaults that included verbal and physical attacks on her person, 2 harassing phone
calls and voicemail messages making threats on her life, 3 and a series of break-ins where
her attacker would expose himself to her, attempt to masturbate in her presence, 4 and
strike her in the jaw with enough force to throw her across the room when she refused to
1. First Amended Complaint at para. 20, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. I I-CV-00151 (E.D.Va. Sept. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
2. Id. at paras. 9-10 (including being called a "stupid fucking female," being spit upon, and being told she
was a "fucking disrespectful non-rate" as her assaulter grabbed her in the buttocks).
3. Id. atpara. 11.
4. Id.
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comply with his demands for sexual contact.5 But because all of this happened while she
was a seaman serving in the U.S. Coast Guard and living on base at the time her superior
officer raped her, 6 her options for reporting the rape within the military were limited to
either a restricted or unrestricted report.7 In addition to these limited options, Ms. Cioca
had to face the high likelihood that even if she used the unrestricted reporting option in
an effort to initiate a criminal investigation against her superior officer, her attacker
would not face criminal consequences for his deplorable actions. 8 Despite this likeli-
hood, Ms. Cioca did report her rapist to her Command, but Command took no immediate
action.
9
The action that Command later initiated included obtaining an "admission of sex"
from Ms. Cioca's rapist, though Command told her that if she continued to report the sex
as rape, she would be prosecuted under court-martial for lying.10 Her rapist, on the other
hand, pled guilty not to rape or sexual assault, but only to hitting Ms. Cioca, and he suf-
fered only "minor loss of pay" and restriction to the base for thirty days as punishment. "1
Subsequent to that court-martial proceeding, Command forced Ms. Cioca to "sign a pa-
per stating she had had an inappropriate relationship with her rapist," and Command si-
lenced Ms. Cioca when she objected that the paper "falsely portrayed [her] rape as con-
sensual sex." 12 In addition, Command failed to keep Ms. Cioca's rape and assault
confidential, and allowed members of her unit and other military staff to "harass [her],
call her names, and spit on her." 13 When military physicians deemed Ms. Cioca's injury
to her jaw serious enough for surgery, Command transferred her to a duty station with no
surgeon, permitted her to be subjected to further sexual harassment, and then discharged
her from the Coast Guard on the grounds that "she had 'a history of inappropriate rela-
tionships with individuals in the Coast Guard.'"14 Because of the rape and other assaults,
she was diagnosed with "post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and
anxiety." 
15
5. Id. atpara. 17.
6. See id. at para. 8.
7. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-924, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
MILITARY PERSONNEL: DOD's AND THE COAST GUARDS SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
PROGRAMS FACE IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERSIGHT CHALLENGES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08924.pdf (stating that active duty service members have two options for re-
porting sexual assault, namely restricted and unrestricted). Restricted reporting allows victims to report a sexu-
al assault and receive victim advocacy services without initiating criminal investigation against the perpetrator
(i.e. their reporting is confidential). Unrestricted reporting requires notification to the chain of command, and a
criminal investigation may ensue. While these requirements do not apply to the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard
has implemented similar reporting options. Id.
8. Id. at 74. Table 8 states that in the year following the attack on Seaman Cioca, only seventy-eight out of
251 offenders against whom action was taken by Command resulted in court-martial proceedings. Eighty-one
of those offenders against whom action was taken received non-judicial punishment, and ninety-two received
administrative actions or discharges. Id.
9. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 18.
10. Id. at para. 22.
11. Id. at para. 23.
12. Id. at para. 25 (stating Command ordered Ms. Cioca to sign the paper and that she "could not refuse to
do so").
13. Id. at para. 24.
14. Id. at para. 26.
15. Id. at paras. 27 28.
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Ms. Cioca is far from being the lone victim of military sexual assault. 16 To the
contrary, military sexual assault has become such a problem that in 2005 Congress inter-
vened, and in its National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Defense
Secretary to implement programs to thwart sexual assault in the military. 17 Nevertheless,
military sexual assault has persisted, leading Ms. Cioca and twenty-eight other plaintiffs
("MSA Plaintiffs") with similar stories to file suit on February 15, 2011, against former
Secretaries of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates. 18 In this suit, the MSA
Plaintiffs have alleged numerous violations of their constitutional rights, including viola-
tions of their substantive due process rights, procedural due process rights, equal protec-
tion rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and freedom of speech rights under the
First Amendment. 19 Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates filed a motion to dismiss, which
was granted on December 9, 2011.20 The MSA Plaintiffs have appealed this decision to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2 1
This note will focus upon the alleged substantive due process violations and argue
that, despite certain roadblocks and exceptions that hinder constitutional tort actions such
as the current civil suit against Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates, there is an overarching
need for the extension of these types of constitutional torts to cover sexual assaults in the
military. Part 11 begins by introducing the history of the constitutional tort, the require-
ments that must be met to maintain such a cause of action, and the exceptions that may
apply to effectively terminate a plaintiff s case. Part III explores one of the constitutional
violations at issue in Cioca v. Rumsfeld and analyzes the viability of this claim against
Defendants Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates. Part IV sets forth policy arguments as to
why a change in the limited legacy of the constitutional tort action may be needed so that
the halls of justice do not close their doors to plaintiffs such as those in Cioca v.
Rumsfeld. Part V concludes by summarizing the grounds that exist for a reversal of the
trial court's order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss and for permitting the MSA
Plaintiffs to, at the very least, have the opportunity to argue the merits of their claims.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics that a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights by
federal officers acting under color of federal law gives rise to a civil cause of action for
damages incurred as a result of the federal officers' unconstitutional conduct. 2 2 From
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CY 05 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT TN THE
MILITARY, 2 (2005), available at http://www.sapr.mil/media/pdf/reports/2005 rtc sexual_ assaults.pdf (report-
ing that 2,374 assaults involving a service member victim and/or a service member offender were reported in
calendar year 2005).
17. Megan N. Schmid, Comment, Combating a Different Enemy: Proposals to Change the Culture of Sexu-
al Assaults in the Military, 55 VILL. L. REV. 475, 481 82 (2010) (citing Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 577, 118 Stat. 1926, 1926-27 (2004)).
18. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 6.
19. Id. at paras. 341 56.
20. See generally Order, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. 11-CV-00151 (E.D.Va. Dec. 9, 2011), ECF No. 22 [here-
inafter Order].
21. Notice of Appeal, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. 11-CV-00151 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012), ECF No. 23, appeal
docketed, No. 12-1065 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012).
22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
2012
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this case, the constitutional tort was born. 23
In a line of cases following Bivens, a general rule has emerged (subject to certain
exceptions) that victims of a violation of a federal constitutional right by a federal gov-
ernment official may recover damages against the government official even in the ab-
sence of any enumerated statute granting such a right.24 Plaintiffs in Bivens actions must
allege facts showing that the named defendants were personally involved and that their
actions led to the violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 25 Because Bivens ac-
tions by their very nature involve defendants occupying federal positions, plaintiffs must
also show that the federal officer involved has no absolute or qualified immunity protec-
tion.26 After establishing these elements, a Bivens plaintiff must then show that no ex-
ceptions apply to his or her case.2 7 These exceptions include: 1) cases in which Congress
has provided an alternative statutory remedy that it has explicitly declared as a substitute
for recovery directly under the Constitution, and that remedy is viewed as equally effec-
tive,2 8 or 2) cases in which there are "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress. '2 9 If a defendant can show that one of the above-
mentioned exceptions applies, the Bivens action is defeated.
30
At this juncture, it is important to note that Bivens actions closely parallel civil ac-
tions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that both provide plaintiffs recovery for viola-
tions of their constitutional rights. 3 1 Although Bivens actions operate solely upon federal
actors and 1983 actions operate upon state actors, they are generally viewed as analogous
insofar as qualified immunity and damages are concerned, and insofar as they both con-
tribute to the expansion of constitutional tort law. 32 However, unlike 1983 actions, which
provide a remedy for all types of constitutional torts, 33 Bivens actions are subject to the
previously mentioned exceptions. 34 Bivens actions usually involve constitutional viola-
tions dealing with the Fourth and Eighth Amendments and with the Fifth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, as these are the only three constitutional rights upon which the
23. John L. Euler, Personal Liability of Military Personnel for Actions Taken in the Course of Duty, 113
MIL. L. REv. 137, 138 (1986).
24. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Bivens Actions United States Supreme Court Cases, 22 A.L.R.
FED. 2d 159, § 2 (2007).
25. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
26. See Exceptions to the Bivens Doctrine, 6 FED. PROC., LAW. ED. § 11-249.
27. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
28. Exceptions to the Bivens Doctrine, supra note 26, at 1.
29. Id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (addressing the civil service employee-Federal Govern-
ment relationship)).
30. Id.
31. William N. Evans, Comment, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling Bivensfrom Section 1983,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), which provides
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the Unit-
ed States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id. For the remainder of this article, "1983" will refer to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
32. Evans, supra note 31, at 1404-05.
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U.S. Supreme Court has granted a Bivens remedy as of the year 2010.35 Because Bivens
actions are implied causes of action, the Court considers the exercise of such an authority
with great caution.36 These limitations and exceptions make Bivens remedies much less
frequent than their 1983 counterparts.
37
A. Personal Involvement and Responsibility for Constitutional Violations
Until the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, circuit courts consistently
held that a Bivens or 1983 plaintiff could hold a federal official responsible for the con-
stitutional violations of his subordinates via a theory of supervisory liability. 38 In Iqbal,
however, the Supreme Court announced that in these causes of action, "where masters do
not answer for the torts of their servants the term 'supervisory liability' is a misno-
mer." 39 Accordingly, it seems that a plaintiff can no longer hold federal officials respon-
sible for constitutional violations under Bivens via a theory of vicarious liability.40 Ra-
ther, a plaintiff must show that the govermnent actor, through his own actions, has
violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights 4 1 and that this violation was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff s constitutional injury. 4
2
Depending on the type of constitutional violations at issue, the factors necessary to
bring a Bivens action will vary.4 3 At the forefront, the analysis requires examining the
complaint to determine whether or not a plaintiff has met the pleading requirements suf-
ficiently enough to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (i.e., the court must determine that the plaintiff has alleged detailed-
enough allegations of the defendant's personal responsibility for the constitutional viola-
tion).44 In most instances, a Bivens plaintiff must show that the federal official acted with
the mens rea applicable under the particular constitutional violation. 45 Even then, no
constitutional injury will have occurred if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate the presence
35. See id. at 1406, n.34 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has only extended a Bivens remedy in three
different constitutional contexts). See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (extending a remedy un-
der the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49
(1979) (extending a remedy under the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Cause); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (extending a remedy under the Fourth
Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause).
36. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 70 (2001).
37. Evans, supra note 31, at 1405.
38. Id. at 1411.
39. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). This decision held that the plaintiff had not established that
Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller - then Attorney General and FBI Director, respectively - were personally
responsible for allegedly discriminating against him on the basis of race, and that they authorized his detention
and sanctioned his torture on that basis. Id. at 683. The Court further held that the named defendants were enti-
tled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff could not show that Defendants had violated a "clearly estab-
lished right" in order to overcome the qualified immunity defense. Id. at 682-83. Purpose, rather than
knowledge, was required to assert liability against the defendants arising from their supervisory responsibili-
ties. Id. at 683.
40. I say seemingly because a three-way circuit split has arisen since the lqbal decision. For more on this
split, see Evans, supra note 31, at 1417-20.
41. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 76.
42. Evans, supra note 31, at 1406.
43. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
44. Id. at 679.
45. Evans, supra note 31, at 1406.
2012
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of that mens rea at the time the official acted. 46
Subsequent to Iqbal is the decision rendered in Vance v. Rumsfeld.4 7 Vance in-
volved two U.S. citizens who claimed that in 2006 U.S. military personnel detained and
illegally tortured them while they were in Iraq working as civilian informants for the
U.S. government. 48 The citizens brought a Bivens action against Donald Rumsfeld in his
individual capacity, alleging violations of their due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. 49 Relying heavily on Iqbal, Defendant Rumsfeld answered that the plain-
tiffs therein had not alleged his personal responsibility for their treatment. 50 Rejecting
Defendant Rumsfeld's argument, the court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
Defendant Rumsfeld's personal responsibility. 51 It reasoned that, because the plaintiffs
alleged that Defendant Rumsfeld was aware of detainee mistreatment through several
generated reports 52 and because this awareness would substantiate the plaintiffs' claims
that Defendant "Rumsfeld was aware of the direct impact that his newly approved treat-
ment methods were having on detainees," the plaintiffs pled Rumsfeld's personal in-
volvement sufficient enough to survive Defendant Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss. 53 As to
the requisite mens rea applicable to the plaintiffs' due process violations, the Vance court
reasoned that "torturous treatment methods" may in and of themselves embody an intent
to inflict harm, 54 and that this conduct is precisely the type of official action that is most
likely to climb to the conscious-shocking level sufficient enough to sustain a due process
claim.
55
B. Absolute and Qualified Immunity
Certain U.S. officials enjoy absolute immunity in Bivens actions; these officials in-
clude the President of the United States, 56 as well as U.S. judges, 57 prosecutors, 58 and
their executive agency equivalents. 59 Other U.S. officials can only make use of qualified
immunity, 60 whereby the official must show as an affirmative defense that his conduct
did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasona-
46. Id.
47. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. 11. 2010). See also Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2 0 11) rev'den banc, opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011) (affirming the district court's denial of Secretary
Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss).
48. Fance, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60.
49. Id. at 961 62.
50. Id. at 962-63.
51. Id. at965.
52. Id. at 964. The reports alleging Rumsfeld's knowledge included a report from the Red Cross detailing
that U.S. detainees in Iraq were mistreated and that Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, confirmed that
Rumsfeld knew of these various reports and regularly informed President Bush of their contents. Id.
53. Id. at 964.
54. Id. at 967.
55. Crnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
56. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1972).
57. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871)).
58. Id. at 509 (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927)).
59. Id. at 515.
60. See generally Rosenhouse, supra note 24, §§ 14-15 (outlining several cases in which the Supreme
Court addressed the qualified immunity of U.S. officials).
Vol. 48:1
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ble person would have known." 6 1 The qualified immunity doctrine balances two compet-
ing but important interests: the necessity of holding public officials accountable for irre-
sponsible exercises of power and the necessity of shielding these officials from "harass-
ment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties responsibly." 62
To resolve a qualified immunity defense, courts often use a two-part test that was
first articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Saucier v. Katz.63 The first step is to
determine, "in [a] light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [whether] the
facts alleged show that the [defendants'] conduct violated a constitutional right." 64 Qual-
ified immunity applies to the federal official unless the official violated such a right.
65
The second step is to determine if the constitutional right was "clearly established" at the
time the constitutional violation occurred. 66 A right is clearly established if it would be
clear to a reasonable official that his action in the situation was unlawful.6 7 While the
Supreme Court has since held that applying the two-part Saucier test is no longer manda-
tory, it is still often used as the appropriate test for measuring whether or not qualified
immunity applies.
6 8
Applying the two-part Saucier test, the Vance v. Rumsfeld court held that Defend-
ant Rumsfeld was not entitled to qualified immunity. 69 The court determined that he was
not entitled to such a defense based on his contention that he, as a reasonable govern-
ment official, could have believed in 2006 that the abuse the plaintiffs alleged was not
unconstitutional. 70 As to the first part of the Saucier test, the court reasoned that when
government conduct "shocks the conscience," such behavior "can and should be deemed
a violation of the Due Process Clause."' 71 Further, the court found it clear that mental and
physical torture such as the torture the plaintiffs suffered is conduct that embodies the
"paradigmatic example of 'shocks the conscience' conduct.' 72 As to the second part of
the Saucier test, the court reasoned that the "right of American citizens to be free from
torture is a well-established part of our constitutional fabric," and that American citizens
do not relinquish their constitutional rights upon traveling to foreign lands, "even when
their destination is a foreign war zone." 73 Thus, Defendant Rumsfeld violated a constitu-
tional right that was clearly established, and the court permitted the plaintiffs to maintain
their Bivens action as to the violation of their substantive due process rights.
74
61. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
62. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
63. See generally Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
64. Id. at 201.
65. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
66. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
67. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 201 02).
68. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that it shall be left to the sound discretion of the
lower courts to determine if the two-part test should be substituted for a more fitting procedure in certain con-
texts).
69. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 970-71 (N.D. 111. 2010).
70. Id. The plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations included: interrogations threatening physical vio-
lence, submission to cold prison cells with insufficient clothing, and deprivation of sleep, food, and medical
care. Id. at 966-67.
71. Id. at966.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 970.
74. Id. at 975.
2012
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C. Explicit, Alternative, and Equally Effective Remedy of Congress
A Bivens claim may not be maintained where there is an alternative statutory
scheme that provides an equally effective remedy. 7 5 This Bivens prong balances the
competing interests between the need to compensate persons for constitutional violations
they have suffered and the importance of deferring to the lawmaking power of Con-
gress. 76 However, if such a statutory scheme exists but Congress makes no mention that
it intends the statute to be the exclusive source for a remedy, a Bivens action may still
withstand the exception.
77
In Carlson v. Green, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Bivens action invoking al-
legations of constitutional violations of due process, equal protection, and the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment could withstand chal-
lenge even though the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 78 could have also provided a
remedy. 79 The Court reasoned that nothing in the FTCA or its legislative history demon-
strated an intention of Congress to pre-empt a Bivens remedy; rather, Congress viewed
the FTCA and Bivens as "parallel, complementary causes of action." 80 The Court also
put forth four reasons why the FTCA would not provide an equally effective remedy: 1)
a Bivens remedy would serve as a greater deterrent, 8 1 2) the petitioner could potentially
recover punitive damages under a Bivens action where the FTCA expressly prohibits pu-
nitive damages, 82 3) a Bivens action permits a plaintiff to have his claims heard by a ju-
ry, whereas the FTCA does not permit jury trials, 83 and 4) an action under the FTCA
would exist "only if the [s]tate in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a
cause of action for that misconduct to go forward," but since this case involved a federal
officer's exposure to liability for violating a prisoner's federal constitutional rights, a
Bivens action would allow the courts to apply uniform rules.
84
The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
may also afford a plaintiff a Bivens remedy where alternative remedies are unavailable to
that plaintiff.85 In Davis v. Passman, the plaintiff brought suit against her former em-
ployer, a Congressman at the time, alleging that he had wrongfully terminated her on ac-
count of her gender. 86 Even though she was an "able, energetic and ... very hard work-
er," the Congressman nonetheless concluded that the "understudy to [his] Administrative
Assistant [should] be a man." 87 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff stated a cause
75. Exceptions to the Bivens Doctrine, supra note 26, at 1.
76. David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the
Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REv. 683, 686 (1985).
77. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980).
78. See generally Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2012).
79. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19 20.
80. Id. at 20.
81. Id. at 20-21 (noting that because a Bivens remedy names defendants individually, it is "almost axiomat-
ic" that the threat of damages upon the individual federal official has a deterrent effect).
82. Id. at21-22.
83. Id. at 22.
84. Id. at 23.
85. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979).
86. Id. at231.
87. Id. at 230.
Vol. 48:1
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of action directly under the Fifth Amendment, which entitled her to a damages remedy
under Bivens if she were to prevail on the merits at remand. 88 The Court reasoned that a
damages remedy was appropriate under the circumstances, 89 that - although a suit
against a Congressman for his unconstitutional acts did raise certain special factors coun-
seling hesitation - those concerns were coextensive with a shield of defense already
available to the Congressman, 90 that there existed no "explicit congressional declaration
that persons" such as Plaintiff Davis who had been injured by "unconstitutional federal
employment discrimination 'may not recover money damages from' those responsible
for the injury," 9 1 and that there was no perceived potential for a "deluge" of similar
claims if plaintiff were permitted to maintain her Bivens action.92 Thus, under the hold-
ing of Davis, a Bivens remedy can lie for a violation of a person's equal protection rights
in the absence of congressionally-created alternative remedies.
93
In theory, the alternative and equally effective remedy exception should not divest
a Bivens plaintiff from seeking a remedy otherwise available to him or her directly under
the Constitution.94 When a Bivens claim is dismissed under this exception, it is quite
possible that a Bivens plaintiff loses certain rights that would be available to him in the
Bivens suit.95 These lost rights are of particular concern because the Supreme Court has
never elaborated upon how an act of Congress can forestall a right deriving directly from
the Constitution. 96 The restriction does not even come into play, in any case, unless
Congress has proactively provided for an alternative statutory remedy deemed equally
effective. 97 This theoretical model, however, does not always transfer over to the Su-
preme Court and lower courts' practical applications. 9 8 This has particularly been the
case in decisions subsequent to the Bivens ruling, where the Supreme Court more readily
emphasizes the separation of powers doctrine, favoring dismissal of a Bivens claim
where Congress has fashioned some sort of remedy, although it may not be as effective
as money damages under Bivens.
99
88. Id. at 248-49.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Id. at 246 (holding that any special factors concerns were "coextensive with the protections afforded by
the Speech or Debate Clause"). This clause would shield the Congressman's actions from judicial scrutiny if
those actions were within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity.'" Id at n. 11 (citing Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975)).
91. Id. at 246 47 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971)).
92. Id. at 248.
93. Id.
94. Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 358
(1989).
95. Id. (noting that congressionally-created administrative remedies deprive Bivens plaintiffs of the jury




99. Id. at 358.
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D. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation in an Absence of Affirmative Action by
Congress
Even if a federal employee is personally responsible for a plaintiff s constitutional
violation, that federal employee is not entitled to any type of immunity, and there is no
alternate and equally effective remedy, a plaintiff may still fail to maintain a Bivens ac-
tion if there are "special factors" present. 100 However, what constitutes "special factors"
can seemingly be whatever the courts say; as the Bivens cases and 1983 cases have de-
veloped, the scope of this exception has become quite expansive. 101
In a military context, the Supreme Court has been unreceptive to granting a Bivens
or 1983 remedy if the constitutional injury is found to be "incident[al] to [military] ser-
vice."'102 The phrase "incidental to military service" has come to be known as the "Feres
Doctrine." 103 Feres v. United States involved the consolidation of three cases brought by
enlisted military service members, 104 all alleging under the FTCA that they suffered in-
juries while on active duty as the result of other service members' negligence. 105 Re-
flecting on pre-existing tort law and interpreting the provisions of the FTCA, the Su-
preme Court held that "[t]he [g]overmnent is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activ-
ity incident[al] to service." 106 The Court reasoned that federal law has always governed
the relationship between military personnel and the government and that it was unaware
of any law that has ever "permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his
superior officers or the [g]overnment he is serving." 10 7 Moreover, the Feres Court could
not avoid considering that the military justice system itself provides "simple, certain, and
uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services." 108 That system,
according to the Court, should likely pre-empt a civil court's examination of claims for
injuries incidental to military service under the FTCA. 109 Since Feres, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the phrase "incidental to military service" quite broadly. 110 It has
precluded suits by both previous and current service members for torts occurring during
service. III It has applied to both recreational and strictly military activity, 112 and it has
100. Id. at 359.
101. Id.
102. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
103. Euler, supra note 23, at 144.
104. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136 37 (noting in the first case a negligence suit involving the wrongful death of a
service man in a barracks fire, while the other two consolidated cases involved military medical malpractice).
105. Id. at 138.
106. Id. at 146.
107. Id. at 141.
108. Id. at 144.
109. Id.
110. Euler, supra note 23, at 145 (noting that the broad application includes "virtually any activity connected
with military service").
111. Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971) (rejecting argument that the "critical time"
under the Feres doctrine is when the injury occurs (in this case, after the serviceman was discharged)).
112. Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1142 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that "an active duty serviceman
temporarily in off-duty status" engaged in horseback riding on a military base cannot sue the federal govern-
ment for the negligence of other servicemen or civilian military employees).
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applied to off-duty assaults committed by one service member against another. 113
In United States v. Shearer, a mother, serving as administratrix of her service
member son's estate, brought a claim against the U.S. government under the FTCA for
its alleged negligence arising from another serviceman's murder of her son. 114 The Court
held that with the passing of the FTCA, Congress did not intend to permit a service
member "to recover from the Government for negligently failing to prevent another ser-
viceman's assault and battery."1 15 The Court reasoned that even though the administra-
trix had framed her complaint in negligence, "[n]o semantical recasting of events" could
change the fact that battery was the direct cause of the serviceman's death and, conse-
quently, battery formed the basis of the administratrix's claim. 116 Thus, the administra-
trix could not avoid the breadth of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) - which provides that the FTCA
shall not apply to claims arising out of certain acts such as assault, battery, false impris-
onment, false arrest, and other intentional torts] 17  by pleading the allegations in her
complaint in terms of negligent failure of the government to stop the assault and battery
upon her son. 118 Moreover, the Court found its interpretation of the § 2680(h) exception
consistent with the Feres Doctrine in that it is of great importance to consider how a
claim based on the FTCA would "require[] [a] civilian court to second-guess military
decisions and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline." 119 Because the
complaint "str[uck] at the core of these concerns," the majority found its opinion to be a
sound one. 120
In Chappell v. Wallace, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on both its own dicta in
Bivens and on the Feres doctrine to deny the plaintiffs therein any Bivens remedy.
12 1
Chappell involved claims by men enlisted in the Navy who alleged that their superior
officers violated their constitutional rights by discriminating against them on the basis of
race. 122 The Court rendered a broad holding that "enlisted military personnel may not
maintain a [Bivens] suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitu-
tional violations."' 123 It reasoned that the military's unique disciplinary structure consti-
tuted a "special factor" counseling hesitation, which dictated that "it would be inappro-
priate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior
officers."' 12 4 This conclusion, the Chappell Court reasoned, was supported by even a cur-
sory review of the Constitution, within which Congress was granted the plenary power
"'To raise and support Armies'; 'To provide and maintain a Navy'; and 'To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."' 125 In the face of clear
113. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52,54 55 (1985).
114. Id. at 53-54.
115. Id. at 59.
116. Id. at54 55.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1974).
118. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55.
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id. at 58.
121. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299, 304 (1983).
122. Id. at 297.
123. Id. at 305.
124. Id. at 304.
125. Id. at 300-01.
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evidence that the Constitution grants the legislature alone the power to regulate the mili-
tary a power that would include regulation of military discipline the judiciary was
unwilling to extend a civil remedy to enlisted soldiers. 
126
On the same day that the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, it ren-
dered a similar "special factors" decision in Bush v. Lucas.12 7 Bush v. Lucas involved the
termination of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") employee
after he made a number of disparaging public statements about one of the NASA-
operated flight centers in which he worked. 128 The Court declined to extend the employ-
ee a Bivens remedy under the First Amendment for violations of his right to free
speech. 129 The Court reasoned that Congress had already created a comprehensive
scheme addressing remedies to civil service employees who had been disciplined or ter-
minated in violation of their First Amendment rights, that Congress was in a better posi-
tion than the judiciary to determine the ramifications of a new type of litigation involving
federal employees and the efficiency of the civil service, 130 and that such facts constitut-
ed "special factors" counseling the Court's hesitation in this instance to extend
Bivens. 
13 1
Even injuries arising from the secret administration of hallucinogenic drugs to ser-
vice members have been determined to fall within the phrase "incidental to military ser-
vice." 132 United States v. Stanley involved the secret administration in 1958 of lysergic
acid diethylamide ("LSD") to an army master sergeant who thought he was volunteering
for experiments designed "to test the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment
as defenses against chemical warfare." 13 3 Shortly after being administered the drug, the
sergeant began suffering from hallucinations, incoherency, and memory loss. 134 His mil-
itary performance deteriorated, and he would occasionally engage in violent fits of rage
upon his wife and children without having any recollection of doing so. 135 It was not un-
til after his discharge that he received a letter asking for his participation "in a study of
the long-term effects of LSD on volunteers who participated in the 1958 tests" that the
sergeant learned of the true nature of the studies. 136 He then filed suit under the FTCA
and Bivens for his injuries. 137
The appellate court held that the sergeant's injuries arose out of an activity "inci-
dental to military service" and thus his claims were barred by the Feres doctrine. 138 Not
finding grounds to disturb the decision of the district court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court left intact those lower court determinations that the
126. Id. at 301, 303 04.
127. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
128. Id. at 369.
129. Id. at 390.
130. Id. at 389-90.
131. Id. at 390 (Marshall, J., concurring).




136. Id. at 671-72.
137. Id. at 672.
138. Id. at 684.
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sergeant was at all relevant times "on active duty and participating in a bona fide Army
program during the time the alleged negligence occurred." 139 This status foreclosed any
FTCA suit as a result of the Feres doctrine. 140 The Court stressed that the "special fac-
tor" exception does not require analysis as to whether Congress has chosen to permit
some form of relief in the particular Bivens or 1983 case involving the "Military Estab-
lishment," but rather "the fact that congressionally uninvited intrusion into military af-
fairs by the judiciary is inappropriate."
14 1
III. THE BIVENS CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ALLEGED IN CIOCA V. RUMSFELD
In their amended complaint, the MSA Plaintiffs made specific allegations against
Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates. 142 As to Defendant Rumsfeld, the plaintiffs alleged he
was aware in 2002 that twenty percent of female veterans were victims of sexual assaults
perpetrated against them by other service members 143 and that, per the passing of Public
Law 105-85,144 Defendant Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defense, was required to set up a
commission to investigate the procedures for the reporting of instances of sexual mis-
conduct in the military. 145 He allegedly ignored this congressional command and "failed
to appoint any member to the commission," even after members of Congress wrote him
regarding their concerns that he and the Department of Defense had disregarded recom-
mendations for substantive change in combating military sexual assault found in eighteen
reports over a sixteen-year span. 14 6 The MSA Plaintiffs allege that as Secretary of De-
fense, Defendant Rumsfeld "expressed scorn and derision" toward the congressional ef-
forts to eliminate military sexual misconduct, and that his inaction demonstrated how the
military was battling Congress' efforts to change the culture of the military, "where rape,
sexual assault and sexual harassment were not prosecuted or otherwise deterred." 
14 7
In addition, the MSA Plaintiffs contended that Defendant Rumsfeld repeatedly al-
lowed military Command to prosecute these rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment
offenders not through court-martial proceedings, but rather under 10 U.S.C. § 815,148
where the so-called punishments often included extra push-ups, 149 promotions, 150 trans-
fers to other divisions before investigations could be concluded, 151 and orders to refrain
from contact with the victims. 152 Defendant Rumsfeld allegedly allowed Command to
139. Id. at 672, 680 ("The issue of service incidence ... was decided adversely to [Stanley] ... and there is
no warrant for reexamining that ruling here." (citation omitted)).
140. Id. at 680.
141. Id. at 683.
142. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 319-40.
143. Id. at para. 320.
144. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Star. 1629, § 591
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1561 (2012)).
145. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 321.
146. Id. atparas. 321 22.
147. Id. at para. 322.
148. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2012) ("Commanding officer's non-judicial punishment").
149. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 206.
150. See id. at paras. 66, 114, 264.
151. See id. at para. 264.
152. See id. atpara. 36.
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"interfere with the impartiality of criminal investigations,"' 153 and he permitted Com-
mand to charge these perpetrators under the general provision for punishment 1 54 as op-
posed to the specific provision for rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct. 
155
Additionally, Defendant Rumsfeld allegedly made certain that military authorities, as
opposed to civilian authorities, prosecuted perpetrators who committed rape and sexual
assault, and did so "knowing that the military judicial system prosecutes only eight per-
cent of those alleged to have engaged in rape or sexual assault, as compared to the civil-
ian system, which prosecutes forty percent of those alleged to be such perpetrators."
' 156
Furthermore, "Defendant Rumsfeld authorized acceptance of [military] recruits" with a
history of domestic and sexual assault convictions through "moral waivers," 157 presum-
ably in contradiction of the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act.158 This
demonstrated to Defendant Rumsfeld's subordinates that the prevention of sexual assault
and rape in the military was not of high concern.
159
As to Defendant Gates, the MSA Plaintiffs allege that he too permitted military
Command to prosecute rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment offenders under 10
U.S.C. § 815, and he permitted Command "to otherwise interfere [with criminal] investi-
gations." 160 In addition, he allowed military Command to retaliate against the MSA
Plaintiffs after they reported the crimes against them and "interfered with and opposed
Congressional directives designed to eliminate rape and sexual assault in the mili-
tary." 16 1 In 2008, Defendant Gates and his subordinates allegedly ordered the director of
the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office ("SAPRO") to ignore the Congres-
sional House Oversight Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs' subpoena
to testify concerning "[SAPRO's] efforts to eradicate military sexual assault." 162 He also
failed to make sure that the Department of Defense "met its statutorily-mandated dead-
line" 163 for executing a database that would "centralize all reports of rapes and sexual
assaults" 164 as prescribed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009.165 As of the time of filing of the MSA Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendant Gates had
153. Id. atpara. 324.
154. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012). This section states
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to
the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
Id.
155. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012).
156. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 326.
157. Id. at para. 329 (noting that these recruits could not have enlisted in the military due to its minimum
enlistment requirements without the "moral waivers").
158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (2012). This statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or oth-
erwise dispose of any firearm or any ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe
that such person ... has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id.
159. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 329.
160. Id. at para. 334.
161. Id. atparas. 335 36.
162. Id. atpara. 336.
163. Id. atpara. 337.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-
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yet to create that database nearly two years after the deadline, and the MSA Plaintiffs
alleged that he had no justification for his failure to implement the database and comply
with this law.
166
A. Personal Involvement of Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates
After Jqbal, the MSA Plaintiffs must show that Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates,
through their own actions, violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights 167 and that these vio-
lations are the "proximate cause of [their] constitutional injur[ies]." 168 Defendants have
argued that the MSA Plaintiffs are asking the court to hold them liable not for their direct
involvement in the injuries alleged, but rather because, "as Secretaries of Defense, they
failed to alter the military's command structure, change how the military investigates and
prosecutes sex crimes, adequately follow congressional directives, and better manage the
Defense Department's response to sexual assaults within the military."' 169 They have al-
so maintained that there are "no allegations that Defendants had any knowledge of Plain-
tiffs' alleged injuries, or that they were even in a position to learn of those injuries" 170
and that the MSA Plaintiffs' allegations "amount to little more than that Defendants had
ultimate responsibility for managing the armed forces." 17 1 Thus, Defendants Rumsfeld
and Gates have argued that the MSA Plaintiffs are attempting to hold them responsible
via a theory of vicarious liability, which Jqbal forbids.
172
Because the MSA Plaintiffs' case involves alleged violations of due process, it is
distinguishable from Iqbal in that Iqbal an invidious discrimination case required a
showing that Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller acted with a mens rea equivalent to dis-
criminatory purpose. 1 73 The MSA Plaintiffs' allegations concerning denial of due pro-
cess fall more in line with Vance v. Rumsfeld, which also involved violations of due pro-
cess, 174 though the mens rea in Vance concerned intent to harm,1 75 whereas the MSA
Plaintiffs' mens rea allegations fall more in line with deliberate indifference. 176 In
417, § 563(a), 122 Stat. 4356 (2008)). The Act states
The Secretary of Defense shall implement a centralized, case-level database for the collection, in a
manner consistent with Department of Defense regulations for restricted reporting, and maintenance
of information regarding sexual assaults involving a member of the Armed Forces, including infor-
mation, if available, about the nature of the assault, the victim, the offender, and the outcome of any
legal proceedings in connection with the assault.
§ 563(a).
166. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 337.
167. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
168. Evans, supra note 31, at 1405.
169. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. 11 -CV-00151
(E.D.Va. Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum].
170. Id. at 13.
171. Id. at 15.
172. Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
173. Id. at 676.
174. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959-60 (N.D. I1. 2010).
175. Id. at 967. Though the district court does not delve much into the mens rea aspect of the plaintiffs' sub-
stantive due process claims, the court does state that it disagrees with the plaintiffs' argument that the allega-
tions are -sufficient to separately demonstrate personal involvement through deliberate indifference." Id. at
964.
176. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 321-22, 336-37 (alleging that Defendants wholly
ignored and refused to comply both with congressional mandates and attempts at congressional oversight of
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Vance, the inquiry before the court in regards to personal responsibility was whether the
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled Defendant Rumsfeld's personal involvement in establish-
ing the policies authorizing the torture of those plaintiffs. 177 Similarly, the MSA Plain-
tiffs must sufficiently plea that Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates were personally involved
and deliberately indifferent to preventing ongoing constitutional deprivations with re-
spect to military sexual assault.
1 78
The notice pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
determines the sufficiency of a pleading and would, in this case, determine if the MSA
Plaintiffs have properly pled personal involvement. 179 A complaint will survive under
this standard if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face."' 180 A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff
has pled factual allegations permitting the court "to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."' 18 1 Moreover, a complaint full of le-
gal conclusions without factual allegations to support those legal conclusions is "not en-
titled to the assumption of truth." 182 When well-pled factual allegations are present, a
court assumes their authenticity and then considers whether or not those facts "plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief."' 183 This plausibility standard often involves deter-
mining if a plaintiff has "nudged" his or her claims "across the line from conceivable to
plausible."
184
While Iqbal requires a court to be vigilant to ensure that claims without plausibility
do not take up the time of high-ranking government officials, 185 it does not serve as an
absolute bar of claims against those officials. 186 Although Iqbal's application is an exer-
cise in "context-specific" inquiries requiring "judicial experience and common sense" to
determine whether a complaint shows a plausible claim for relief,187 the MSA Plaintiffs
have alleged specific acts and knowledge on the part of Defendants Rumsfeld and
Gates. 188 In their opposition to the Defendants' dismissal brief, the MSA Plaintiffs point
to their allegations that Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates knew sexual assaults were oc-
curring in the military,189 and they knew that those service members who reported these
crimes "confronted a widespread culture of retaliation" for reporting. 19  Despite this
knowledge, the MSA Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates "intention-
SAPRO's policies and efforts).
177. lance, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 965.
178. See Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 19-20, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. 1 1-CV-00151
(E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Opposition].
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
180. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
181. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
182. Id. at 679 (noting that legal conclusions may "provide the framework of a complaint," but cannot stand
alone).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 680 (quoting Tivombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
185. Id. at 686.
186. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
187. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
188. See Opposition, supra note 178, at 19-21.
189. Id. at 20 (citing First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 302 04).
190. Id. (citing First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 305 09, 319 20, 333 34).
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ally and knowingly.., ignored and refused to comply with Congressional mandates"
addressing military sexual assault, and they obstructed "Congressional oversight"
through their refusal to comply with congressional subpoenas to testify regarding
SAPRO's efforts to rid the military of the unparalleled frequency of sexual assault that
military members have experienced. 191 In fact, Defendants have conceded that they were
aware of sexual assaults in the military, 192 and Plaintiffs have asked that this judicial
admission be treated as an established fact. 193 In so doing, the MSA Plaintiffs have ar-
gued this admission shows that "Defendants themselves, [and] not [solely] their subordi-
nates, acted with regard to rape and sexual assault" in the military. 194
The MSA Plaintiffs' allegations are not legal conclusions unsupported by factual
development, and thus these allegations should meet Rule 8's pleading requirements. 195
The allegations are factual allegations that are entitled to an assumption of authentici-
ty.196 They also "nudge" the line from a conceivable to plausible level of deliberate in-
difference. 19 7 There is no other likely explanation as to why a federal official would
command his executive branch employee to ignore a congressional subpoena to testify
concerning the military sexual assault matters that Congress had delegated to that em-
ployee's division, if not to show a deliberate indifference toward military sexual as-
sault. 198 There is no other likely explanation as to why Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates
would permit military Command, time and time again, to punish sexual criminals
through non-judicial punishment, 199 to personally authorize "moral waivers" of persons
with known sexual assault backgrounds, 20 and to "interfere[] with and oppose[] Con-
gressional directives "designed to eliminate rape and sexual assault in the military,"'2 01 if
not to show their deliberate indifference towards the MSA Plaintiffs constitutional
rights. Accordingly, Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates have been given sufficient notice of
the claims against them as required by Rule 8 and Iqbal,202 and these claims should be
plausible and sufficient enough to satisfy Rule 8's pleading requirements.
20 3
B. The Qualified Immunity Status of Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates
To address Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates' qualified immunity defense, one must
address whether a reasonable official in Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Gates' posi-
tions would have known that the conduct they allegedly authorized violated the U.S.
191. Id. (citing First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 321-22, 336-37).
192. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 2
193. Opposition, supra note 178, at 2.
194. Id. at22.
195. See Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
196. See id.
197. See id. at 680 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
198. Opposition, supra note 178, at 20 (citing First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 321 22,
336-37).
199. See supra notes 148 52.
200. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 329.
201. Id. atpara. 336.
202. See supra notes 179 84.
203. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The detailed Complaint provided Secretary
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Constitution. 2 04 In their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants
have meshed the issue of personal involvement and the doctrine of qualified immuni-
ty.2 05 Some courts have held that the issue of personal involvement and the doctrine of
qualified immunity are distinct and should be separately determined. 2 06 Blending the
two may, however, be proper in certain circumstances where the "sufficiency of [a plain-
tiffs] pleading[] is both 'inextricably intertwined with' . . . and 'directly implicated
by' . . . the qualified immunity defense." 2 0 7 This approach would seemingly abandon the
Saucier v. Katz test, 2 0 8 which is something the Supreme Court might condone in this in-
stance based upon the test's shortcomings 2 09 and the fact that it would probably be more
wise here to first determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity -
and are thus entitled to the district court's ordered dismissal of the lawsuit - before de-
termining whether the MSA Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation.
2 10
C. The MSA Plaintiffs' Substantive Due Process Claim
The MSA Plaintiffs maintain that they have a "right to bodily integrity under the
Fifth Amendment," 2 1 1 that both Defendants during their time as Secretaries of Defense
condoned a military culture permitting rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment to
flourish, 2 12 and that their acts and failures to act in respect to these crimes "violated [the
MSA] Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights" under the Fifth Amendment. 2 1 3 As the
law of due process has evolved, substantive due process claims will lie in order to protect
the individual against arbitrary government action. 2 14 While substantive due process lim-
its the government in both its legislative and executive capabilities, the factors that de-
termine what is "fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specif-
ic act of a governmental officer that is at issue." 2 15 In the executive realm, case law has
stressed "that only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the
204. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
205. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 11.
206. lance, 653 F.3d 591 (affirming the district court decision).
207. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (citations omitted).
208. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
209. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding, after a lengthy discussion of its shortcom-
ings, that the sequential two-step Saucier test is no longer mandatory); Id. at 237 (quoting Brief for Nat. Assoc.
Crim. Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 30, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001)) (arguing that the Saucier test "disserve[s] the purpose of qualified immunity" because it "forces the
parties to endure additional burdens of suit - such as the costs of litigating constitutional questions... -
when the suit could otherwise be disposed of more readily"); Saucier, 553 U.S. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in judgment) (arguing that the two-part test has quite the potential to confuse); Purtell v. Mason 527 F.3d 615,
622 (7th Cir. 2008) (criticizing Saucier's "rigid order of battle"); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitu-
tion: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1249, 1275-76 (2006) (arguing that the Saucier test's requirement
that a court first decide whether the official's alleged conduct violated the Constitution is a question that forces
courts to either "gratuitously declare a new constitutional right in dictum or decide that the claimed right does
not exist").
210. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237 (quoting Brief for Nat. Assoc. Crim. Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 30, Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194 (2001)).
211. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 342.
212. Id. atpara. 343.
213. Id. atpara. 344.
214. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
558 (1974)).
215. Id. at 846.
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constitutional sense." 2 16 Three different types of culpability may pertain to substantive
due process violations: negligence, deliberate indifference, and intent.
2 17
The U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand substantive due process
claims below a requisite mens rea of intention to harm. 218 This is so because the substan-
tive due process concept of conscious-shocking "points clearly away from liability, or
clearly toward it, only at the ends of the tort law's spectrum of culpability." 2 19 In ac-
cordance with judicial tradition limiting the breadth of substantive due process, courts
have recurrently held that liability cannot be had for negligently inflicted harm because it
is "categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.' ' 220 On the other
hand, conduct falling within the culpability category of intent-to-harm is the type of con-
duct that will most likely support a substantive due process claim because it is this level
of conduct that will most likely shock the conscience. 22 1 In the middle lies deliberate in-
difference, where gauging what rises to a level of conscious-shocking demands a more
exacting analysis of the circumstances found in each case.
222
By common sense and definition, the term "deliberate indifference" is reasonably
invoked "only when actual deliberation is practical,' 223 and not in situations requiring
quick decision-making without the luxury of precautionary planning. 22 4 Actual delibera-
tion has been found to be practical in cases involving the custodial detention of inmates,
where foresight into a prisoner's welfare "is not only feasible but obligatory." 225 This is
so because the Constitution imposes a duty upon the government to assume responsibil-
ity for a person's welfare after the government has deprived that person of his liberties,
and a failure to meet that duty is a transgression upon due process. 226 When there is an
opportunity for reflection coupled with a prolonged failure to care, that is the point at
which indifference becomes truly shocking.
22 7
Without evidence of intent-to-harm, the MSA Plaintiffs' substantive due process
claims fall into the close-call category of deliberate indifference. 228 There is no question
that Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates found themselves in situations where actual delib-
eration concerning eradication of military sexual assault was practical. 229 Eliminating
sexual assault in the military does not require fast-paced remedial thought, as it has been
216. Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
217. Brad K. Thoenen, Note, Stretching the Fourteenth Amendment and Substantive Due Process: Another
"Close Call" For 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 71 Mo. L. REV. 529, 534-35 (2006).
218. Id. at 534.
219. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848.
220. Id. at 848-49.
221. Id. at 849.
222. Id. at 850.
223. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 853.
225. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
226. Id. at 851-52.
227. Id. at 853 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)).
228. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 321-22, 336-37(alleging that the defendants ig-
nored congressional mandates and knew of the pervasive sexual assault in the military, but lacking evidence of
intentional harm).
229. See id. at paras. 302-04 (stating that data gathered regarding sexual assault from 2006 to 2009 shows
that military sexual assault and rape grew with each new year).
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the subject of much deliberation and discussion since as early as the year 199 1.230 Addi-
tionally, punishing sexual assault in the military does not require split-second decision-
making, as it is a process of reporting the crime, gathering evidence, and determining
what judicial - or non-judicial - methods should be taken against the accused. 23 1
Where Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates will likely launch their attack on this substantive
due process claim is whether or not their executive action was so egregious as to be "ar-
bitrary in the constitutional sense, ' 232 and whether or not the close call of deliberate in-
difference should favor or disfavor a finding of liability in this instance.
233
The MSA Plaintiffs have likened their situation to situations that prisoners face,
234
at least in the sense that members of the armed forces, like prisoners, cannot engage in
"self-help against Constitutional deprivations" like civilians can.2 35 Active duty service
members cannot move homes or change cities, they cannot take personal actions like ci-
vilians can such as calling the police, seeking the aid of a shelter, or getting out of
town23 6  and they cannot simply quit their jobs to go find new employment away from
the rapists that they are forced to live near, work with, and salute everyday.237 In this re-
spect, the argument can potentially be made that Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates should
have had the obligatory foresight to consider the welfare and bodily integrities of mem-
bers of the armed services.
238
The MSA Plaintiffs could argue that Defendants' deliberate instructions to subor-
dinates to ignore congressional subpoenas concerning the eradication of rape in the mili-
tary,239 their authorization and execution of moral waivers for known sexual offend-
ers, 24 and their interference with and opposition to congressional directives designed to
eliminate military sexual assault and rape24 1 constituted conscious-shocking conduct that
is contrary to substantive due process. If the MSA Plaintiffs can show the availability of
a time for reflection coupled with a convincingly prolonged failure to care - either
through evidence that Defendants ignored and undermined legislation directed at eradi-
cating military sexual assault and that their acknowledgement of the problem and com-
mitment to positive change is merely lip service, or through evidence of their "scorn and
230. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 657 (1996)
(stating that the 1991 Tailhook convention for Navy and Marine aviators, where U.S. military men sexually
assaulted at least ninety people, led to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense conducting a report
and finding that the sexual assaults at the convention represented only "the small visible tip of an underlying
iceberg of military sexual assault").
231. See U.S. DEPNT OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 5 8 (2004),
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/May2004/d20040513SATFReport.pdf (outlining the various rules,
stages, and forms of punishment in the military justice system).
232. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992).
233. See Thoenen, supra note 217, at 534-38 (discussing the analysis of deliberate indifference in various
cases and its fine-line status as a mens rea for evaluating substantive due process claims).
234. See Transcript of Hearing on Motions at 12-13, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. I I-CV-00151 (2011) [herein-
after Transcript]; Opposition, supra note 178, at 20; First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 318.
235. Opposition, supra note 178, at 20.
236. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 318.
237. Transcript, supra note 234, at 13.
238. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998).
239. See supra note 162.
240. See supra note 157.
241. See supra note 201.
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derision toward Congressional efforts to eradicate" military sexual assault and rape 242
then perhaps their substantive due process claims of deliberate indifference may draw the
line of liability in a place that falls in their favor.
243
D. Is there an Explicit, Alternative, and Equally Effective Congressional Remedy?
This exception does not apply unless Congress has proactively provided for an al-
ternative statutory remedy that it has deemed equally effective. 24 4 There is no alternative
remedy for the MSA Plaintiffs under the FTCA, as that has specifically been eliminated
as an avenue of recovery in the Feres v. United States decision. 245 In their memorandum
in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates did not raise the
question of whether or not there is an explicit, alternative, and equally effective congres-
sional remedy that would bar the MSA Plaintiffs' Bivens suit.24 6 This issue has been dis-
cussed in other Supreme Court Bivens cases, namely with respect to the fact that Con-
gress has enacted statutes establishing a framework "of justice to regulate military life,
taking into account the special patterns that define the military structure. ' 24 7 For exam-
ple, Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") provides service
members with the opportunity to challenge the wrongs of commanding officers, whereby
an officer exercising general court-martial over the offending commander hears the com-
plaint and takes measures to remedy the wrong complained of.24 8 Whether or not a rem-
edy under the UCMJ would provide what Congress would deem to be an equally effec-
tive remedy for these plaintiffs is a question that could arguably be answered in favor of
the MSA Plaintiffs based upon many of the same factors the Supreme Court considered
in Carlson v. Green.
249
E. Are There Special Factors Present That Should Defeat the MSA Plaintiffs' Claims?
Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates have argued that because there is a strong pre-
sumption against extending Bivens remedies in new contexts, 2 50 and because the MSA
242. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 322.
243. See Leiwis, 523 U.S. at 853.
244. See Rosen, supra note 94, at 358.
245. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (barring a remedy under the FTCA "where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service"). See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 299 (1983) (noting how the Feres Court held that, even assuming the FTCA "might be read literally to
allow tort actions against the United States for injuries suffered by a soldier in service, Congress did not intend
to subject the Government to such claims by a member of the armed forces").
246. See generally Memorandum, supra note 169.
247. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302.
248. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2012). This statute specifically provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, and
who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any su-
perior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The officer exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for redressing
the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true
statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.
Id.
249. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 23 (1980); supra text accompanying notes 81 84.
250. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 6 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky. 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988)).
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Plaintiffs' claims are "incident to their military service, ' 25 1 special factors condemn the
MSA Plaintiffs' Bivens claims to failure and require dismissal of their case. 2 52 These ar-
guments are the grounds on which the district court granted Defendants' motion to dis-
miss. 2 5 3 Specifically, the district court judge found that because the MSA Plaintiffs are
suing the defendants for "their alleged failures with regard to oversight and policy setting
within the military disciplinary structure," their claims fall within the special factors that
counsel hesitation because "congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by
the judiciary is inappropriate." 2 5 4 In his ruling, the judge found it difficult to get around
"clear mandates from the Supreme Court not to involve the courts in inherently and inex-
tricably-tied military oversight issues.
' 2 5 5
However, Supreme Court jurisprudence has determined that "judicial abstention
should occur only when the injuries being litigated are casually connected to the military
service, not merely occurring during the time of military service." 2 56 Jurisdiction should
be had when service members make claims involving injuries "not caused by their ser-
vice except in the sense that all human events depend [on] what has already tran-
spired." 2 57 When there is no military function or purpose being served, special factors do
not prevent a court from hearing the claims of military personnel. 258 This is the argu-
ment that the MSA Plaintiffs attempted to set forth during their hearing on Defendants'
motion to dismiss.
2 5 9
The distinguishing factor that sets the MSA Plaintiffs' case apart from the inci-
dence to military service rationale found in United States v. Stanley and Chappell v. Wal-
lace is the fact that those cases involved conduct for a military purpose. 26 There can be
no military purpose furthered by the incidence of sexual assault and rape amongst mili-
tary personnel. 26 1 It has no military function, and "in fact is antithetical to military disci-
pline."'262 Moreover, the defendants themselves even state there can be "no question that
251. Id. at 9 (arguing that because the MSA Plaintiffs were raped while they were serving in the U.S. mili-
tary, there "can be no question that [their] claims are incident[al] to their military service, necessitating precise-
ly the type of judicial review of military organization and discipline that is squarely foreclosed by Chappell and
Stanley") (emphasis added) (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) and United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669 (1987)).
252. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 11.
253. Order, supra note 20, at 2.
254. Id. (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987)).
255. Transcript, supra note 234, at 11.
256. Opposition, supra note 178, at 4.
257. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (holding that two plaintiffs, as members of the armed
forces, could maintain their 1983 claims against the United States for the negligence of one of its civilian army
truck drivers in iniuring and/or killing said plaintiffs because the personal iniury suit "had nothing to do with
the [plaintiffs'] army careers").
258. See id.
259. Transcript, supra note 234, at 11 12. The MSA Plaintiffs' attorney, Susan L. Burke, claimed that
"[h]ere ... you have conduct that the military itself has said has absolutely no military function, absolutely no
military purpose .. ." Id.
260. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (administering LSD to soldier without their consent
found to further government's national security interest because its use was tested to see if a soldier could with-
stand interrogation); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (ordering soldiers to perform duties on a naval
battleship on an allegedly discriminatory basis found to fall within the line of duties intended to further the mil-
itary mission).
261. Opposition, supra note 178, at 5.
262. Transcript, supra note 234, at 11 12.
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rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment are contrary to law and Department of De-
fense policy." 263 Here, the injuries merely occurred during the time that the MSA Plain-
tiffs were serving in the military, the injuries are not "casually connected to military ser-
vice," and thus there should be no special factors encouraging judicial abstention in this
case. 264 The MSA Plaintiffs maintain it is "perfectly permissible in this democracy for a
jury to sit and adjudicate whether or not [Defendants Rumsfeld and Gates] took adequate
steps" to counter what they knew to be a rampant military sexual assault problem.
265
IV. THE SPECIAL FACTORS SPECTRUM: A POLICY DECISION
At this point in the litigation, the MSA Plaintiffs have seen the district court's dis-
missal of their case without an opportunity to proceed on the merits of their claims.
266
This is so because of the harsh legal ground that encompasses Feres' incident to military
service doctrine. 2 67 Case law subsequent to Bivens and Feres speaks of the "varying lev-
els of generality at which one may apply [the] 'special factors' analysis." 2 68 On the nar-
row end of the spectrum, one might require there to be "reason to believe that in the par-
ticular case the disciplinary structure of the military would be affected."' 269 A bit more
broadly, one could prohibit Bivens actions whenever there is any underlying officer-
subordinate relationship present in the circumstances of the case. 27 Even more broadly,
Bivens actions could be prohibited in officer-subordinate situations and beyond "when it
affirmatively appears that military discipline would be affected." 27 1 Even more broadly,
and where the Supreme Court currently chooses to apply special factors analysis, "one
might disallow Bivens actions whenever the injury arises out of activity 'incident to ser-
vice.''272 Most broadly, the Court could conceivably prohibit Bivens actions by ser-
vicemen altogether.27 3 Where the Court chooses to place its rule along this narrow to
broad scale "depends upon how prophylactic one thinks the prohibition should be," i.e.,
how often the Court thinks it is appropriate to have occasional impairment of the military
discipline structure, "which in turn depends upon how harmful and inappropriate judicial
intrusion upon military discipline is thought to be." 274 Gauging this scale is of course a
policy decision, without any truly right answer, but the Supreme Court has thus far been
unwilling to change the place along the scale on which it has decided to rest its special
factors decisions.
275
Here where the MSA Plaintiffs' allegations do seem to involve relationships be-
263. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 1.
264. See Opposition, supra note 178, at 4.
265. Transcript, supra note 234, at 14.
266. See Order, supra note 20, at 2 (granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss); Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss at 1-2, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, No. 11-CV-00151 (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
267. See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).







275. Id. (deciding to maintain the "incident to service" bar to both Bivens and FTCA claims).
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tween officers and their subordinates, where on a broad level they do seem to be allega-
tions that may affect military discipline, 2 76 and where it would seem that even a narrow-
er interpretation of the special factors spectrum could fall outside their favor - there is a
distinguishing factor that sets their case apart. This distinguishing factor is that, delving
deeper into the issues, this case would not be one in which the judiciary decided to make
law affecting military discipline. 2 77 The legislative branch is the body to which the Con-
stitution grants the authority "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and Naval Forces. ' 2 78 In this case, the legislative body has spoken; it has passed
legislation pertaining to the examination of military policies and procedures regarding
the investigation and report of sexual misconduct within the military, 279 and it has made
efforts to change the culture of the military, which the leaders of the executive branch
have resisted. 28° Instead of making case law that would affect military discipline, a deci-
sion favorable to the MSA Plaintiffs would simply mean that the judiciary has taken a
"look at the Executive Branch system and measure[d] whether or not the people in
charge have done their job."28 1 In the event the Fourth Circuit does not agree with the
MSA Plaintiffs that their claims are not incidental to military service, 282 this policy ar-
gument favoring a narrowing of the special factors application - particularly since such
an application would arguably not affect military discipline could potentially be an
alternate ground to vacate Defendants' motion to dismiss and let the case proceed on the
merits.
V. CONCLUSION
In November of 2011, House Representative Jackie Speier introduced House Bill
3435, the Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention Act. 283 If passed, this bill
would take the "reporting, oversight, and investigation of sexual assaults out of the hands
of the military's normal chain of command and place it in an autonomous office of mili-
tary experts. '284 While the new Secretary of Defense has just recently announced two
new Department of Defense policies designed to help victims of military sexual assault,
military-focused human rights organizations say the new measures are not enough.
285
These measures do nothing to change the broad discretion given to individual military
276. See generally First Amended Complaint, supra note 1.
277. See id.
278. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
279. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1629, § 591
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1561 (2012)).
280. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 322.
281. Transcript, supra note 234, at 12. Counsel for the MSA Plaintiffs argues here that the judicial branch
should be able to determine whether the executive branch has done the job Congress has mandated that it do.
For example, she asks, have the leaders of the executive branch "followed Congressional directives" pertaining
to sexual assault and rape in the military?
282. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949); Transcript, supra note 234, at 11-12; supra text
accompanying notes 257 59.
283. See H.R. 3435, 112th Cong. (2011).
284. Laura Bassett, Military Rape Policies Announced By Dejense Department Don't Fix Problem, Groups
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commanders who often have glaring conflicts of interest, as they frequently "may be re-
sponsible for both the victim and the perpetrator, making it difficult for him or her to
make objective decisions about whether the case will go forward, who will prosecute,
who will defend, and what disciplinary actions to take." 286 House Bill 3435, however,
would solve this problem and is an active congressional step necessary to implement real
change to eradicate military sexual assault.
287
Although these changes are steps along the path toward progressively eliminating
the military sexual assault problem, they do little to remedy the damages that have al-
ready happened to the MSA Plaintiffs. These plaintiffs have made the valid argument
that what has happened to them is not something incidental to their military service. 288 If
this is not something incidental to military service, then there are no special factors pre-
cluding this Bivens case on that issue. Reflecting on Supreme Court jurisprudence, one
may ask for what purpose the special factors have been created. If they have been created
because the judiciary must be deferential to the military when the circumstances involve
unique issues within the control of the military and outside the expertise of the judicial
branch - including topics such as "when to fire rockets, when to drop bombs, how to
interrogate enemies, and so forth '289 _ then perhaps the incident to military service test
best serves that goal.29 0 But when the circumstances involve "[a]djudication, the prose-
cution of rapists ... the investigatory process, none of that is something unique to the
military structure or outside [judicial] expertise. ' 29 1 Rape is not something service men
and women sign up for when they join the armed forces. 292 Perpetuation of the problem
through the deliberate indifference of those who are charged with leading the military is
a wrong that can be remedied through judicial determinations. The MSA Plaintiffs have
"chartered a path" that distinguishes their case from those decisions that have interpreted
incidence to service and limited Bivens actions not found to meet that test.293 The Bivens
case stood for the principles that "no official is above the law," and "no violation of [a]
right should [go] without a remedy. '2 94 Permitting this case to proceed on the merits of
the MSA Plaintiffs' constitutional claims would uphold those principles and provide the




287. See generally H.R. 3435.
288. See Opposition, supra note 178, at 4.
289. Transcript, supra note 234, at 10.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 14.
293. Id.
294. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 706 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) (referencing
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
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